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In a bracing recent paper1 my old friend bob Watt invites me to make a 
“paradigm shift.”2 He is inspired to do so by his reading of an essay that 
Stephen Shute and I wrote nearly two decades ago, called ‘The Wrongness 
of Rape.’3 The world as portrayed in this essay, Watt says, “does not accord 
with reality as perceived in our everyday lives by most, if not all, of us.”4 
The words “if not all” in this sentence add something of importance. Watt 
hopes that the world as portrayed in our essay does not accord with reality 
even as Shute and I perceive it. I think he worries (with characteristic 
kindness) that, if we perceive reality in the way in which it is portrayed in 
‘The Wrongness of Rape’, we are basket cases in need of therapeutic 
intervention. 
In this response – in which I take the opportunity to revisit several 
themes from the original essay – I hope to reassure Watt (and others of like 
mind) that the position taken in the essay, particularly on the subject of 
emotions, is not the disturbing one that he reads into it. There is no reason, 
I will suggest, for me to “reserve [my] analysis to [my] professional li[fe].”5 
Nor do I so reserve it. The analysis we offered in ‘The Wrongness of Rape’ 
comports with my own everyday experience. For the Shute-Gardner 
account of the wrongness of rape has quite ordinary phenomenological 
ramifications. Ultimately it helps to explain, rather than to explain away, 
the central importance of emotional experience in human life, including of 
course my own. 
 
                                                 
* Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Oxford. 
1 bob Watt, ‘The Story of Rape: Wrongdoing and the Emotional Imagination’ 
(2014) 26 Denning Law Journal 46. Hereafter Watt. For the uninitiated, bob writes 
his forename with a lower-case ‘b.’ 
2 Ibid. 
3 J Gardner and S Shute, ‘The Wrongness of Rape’ in Jeremy Horder (ed), Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence: Fourth Series (OUP 1998); reprinted with minor changes 
in John Gardner, Offences and Defences (OUP 2007). Hereafter Gardner and 
Shute, ‘Wrongness.’ Page references here are to the 2007 reprint, which is used by 
Watt and many others. 
4 Watt (n 1) 46. 
5 Ibid. 
 





Watt thinks that Shute and I underestimate the importance of emotions 
in moral experience, and, more generally, in human life. We make “a mere 
sideshow” of them, he says.6 To bear this claim out he latches onto the 
technical word “epiphenomenon,”7 which Shute and I used several times in 
our essay.8 In the crucial sentence, to which our repetitions of the word are 
implicitly referring, we claimed that “emotional reactions [to rape] ... must 
be epiphenomenal, in the sense that they cannot constitute, but must 
shadow, the basic, or essential, wrongness of rape.”9 This sentence does not 
say what Watt reads it to say, namely that emotional reactions to rape can 
only play a minor or peripheral role in determining the wrongness of rape. 
It says that emotional reactions to rape can only play a derivative role in 
determining the wrongness of rape. A derivative role in the relevant sense 
might well be a major role, even the dominant role. 
Consider an example from a very different context. I have chosen the 
example to bring out that the Shute-Gardner argument is not specifically 
about emotional reactions, but about reactions more generally. The most 
weighty reason to keep a promise, and the one that lends most force to one’s 
duty to do so, is often the fact that the promisee relied on it. Why would she 
have relied on it? Well, it was a promise, and a promise is (barring special 
circumstances) binding on the promisor, and thus fit to be relied upon. So 
far so good. But the promisee’s reliance cannot now be used to explain why 
the promise is binding. If the fact that a promise is anyway binding is what 
makes it fit to be relied upon, the fact that the promise is relied upon cannot 
also be what makes it binding. The reliance reason for keeping it now points 
back to some other reason for keeping it. This reason (whatever it is) is the 
“basic or essential” reason, the one that holds us to our promises even when 
there is no reliance, and hence helps to justify reliance when there is 
reliance. Notice, however, that this basic or essential reason may have 
rather little force on its own. One’s duty to keep a promise may not be very 
stringent until the reliance comes along. Still, the reliance remains the 
derivative consideration; it builds on the more basic one.10 
                                                 
6 Ibid 49. 
7 Ibid 46, 47, 49, 50, 59, 60. 
8 Gardner and Shute, ‘Wrongness’ (n 3) 6, 7, 21. 
9 Ibid 7. 
10 For recent discussion of this issue in the context of promising (with greater 
subtlety than the present context allows) see D Owens, ‘The Possibility of Consent’ 
Ratio 24 (2011) 402 and J Raz, ‘Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise?’ in G Klass, 
G Letsas, and P Saprai, Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (OUP 2014). 
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Shute and I thought that much the same points could be made in 
connection with strong feelings about rape, including but not limited to the 
strong feelings of those who are raped. If the strong feelings in question are 
reasonable ones (as we both thought they generally are) there must be 
something else wrong with rape, some more “basic or essential” wrong-
making feature of rape, that makes the strong feelings reasonable. Possibly 
the “basic or essential” feature doesn’t make rape very wrong by itself. 
Possibly the grief or shame or horror or rage of the victim (and possibly, in 
some cases, the anxiety or apprehension of other potential victims, the pity 
or sorrow or guilt of friends and family, etc.) is what makes the biggest 
difference to the wrongness of rape. So, possibly, it is the trauma of rape – 
let’s use this as our umbrella word – that should most concern us in the end. 
But that doesn’t in any way neutralise our interest in finding what else it is 
about rape that makes for such trauma. For we should think of the victims 
of rape as people like ourselves, capable of evaluating their own reactions 
and (perhaps only with therapeutic help) eventually getting them in some 
kind of perspective and proportion. Shute and I regarded the possibility of 
relating to one’s emotions in this way as a matter of very great importance, 
not just for theorists like ourselves who are interested in the emotions as a 
subject of study, but also for the survivors of rape. Rape, we thought, is 
dehumanising enough already without those who have been raped being 
condescendingly regarded as having lost their human sensitivity to value, 
their ability to interpret what has happened, to see how it matters, and to 
relate critically to their own reactions to it (as well as to the reactions of 
others). The idea that rape survivors can only be passive in the face of their 





Shute and I devised a hypothetical, now widely-discussed in the 
literature, to help us work out what it is about rape that is basically or 
essentially wrong, something that could explain why strong feelings about 
it are in order. The rape in the hypothetical (heavily sleeping victim, no ill-
effects, rape never comes to her or anyone else’s attention, rapist 
coincidentally killed just after leaving) was structured to leave no trauma 
behind it, except for the traumatised reactions of our readers.11 The latter 
exception is highly significant, although we deliberately did not mention it 
at the time. We wanted the imaginary rape in our essay to stir up strong 
feelings in our readers even though (by hypothesis) there could be no 
                                                 
11 Gardner and Shute, ‘Wrongness’ (n 3). 
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feelings at all about the rape on the part of anyone inside the imaginary 
world in which it happened, for in that world (by hypothesis) the rape went 
entirely undetected. 
In this ambition of stirring up emotion in our readers we succeeded 
beyond our dreams. Watt is just the latest in a long line of readers to react 
to our scenario with “disgust ... outrage ... an inward shudder for the 
victim.”12 Indeed that was how we reacted to the example ourselves. Why 
did we look for the same reaction in others? We wanted to test whether the 
relative moral importance of trauma in rape cases is similar to – for example 
– the relative moral importance of reliance in promise cases. In promise 
cases, it is plausible to think that reliance is what tends to make the biggest 
difference to the stringency of the duty to keep the promise. It is plausible 
to think that it is not very important to keep a promise that is never relied 
upon by anyone – say, because it is promptly forgotten by everyone. Is the 
same true of a rape that goes undetected? Our experiment suggested that, 
for most people, it is not. And Watt is one of the guinea-pigs who has helped 
to confirm that result. He has helped to confirm our hunch (reflected in our 
own feelings about the case we invented) that an undetected rape, hence a 
rape giving rise to no trauma, is still very seriously wrong. Would Watt 
want to say that the rape in our scenario is wrong but not very seriously 
wrong, something like breaking a promise that nobody recalls or telling a 
lie that nobody hears? Clearly not. Like us, he is outraged by the rape. In 
which case, he helps to vindicate the approach of our essay. There is 
something seriously wrong with a rape even when, by hypothesis, it gives 
rise to no trauma. What is that something? That was precisely our question, 
and it has not gone away. 
Watt could not be further from the truth, then, when he says that our 
“readers are implicitly required to step inside [the] analysis and to abandon 
the normal human responses felt when a person is confronted with a story 
of rape.”13 Such abandonment by our readers would have defeated part of 
the object of the exercise.14 We needed plenty of serious reader-outrage in 
order to test our hunch that rape with no bad consequences, including no 
                                                 
12 Watt (n 1) 49. 
13 Ibid. 
14 A more apt target for Watt’s quoted criticism would be Pedro Almadóvar’s film 
Talk to Her (2002) in which a scenario akin to the one Shute and I devised is 
embellished, almost romanticised, in such a way as to make the viewer “abandon 
the normal human responses felt when ... confronted with a story of rape.” 
Almadóvar’s experiment differed from ours. He really did want his audience to 
“step inside his analysis” for the first hour of the film – only to be disturbed, as he 
escorted them back out, at how easily he had made them complicit or quiescent. 
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trauma, is still wrong in a very serious way, such that one should still be 
seriously outraged on being told of it. And still seriously outraged, notice, 
even when it is identified in advance as an imaginary scenario and 
presented in an emotionally-flat “analytical philosophy” tone.15 Nobody 
feels this pained – do they? – if we test them with imaginary cases of 
inconsequential promise-breaking, inconsequential lying, or 
inconsequential theft. To warrant such outrage whatever is “basically or 
essentially” wrong with rape must be something towards the more 
outrageous end of the spectrum. While the trauma felt by survivors may 
still be a major factor in assessing the seriousness of particular rapes – we 
left that contentious matter open16 – the underlying outrageousness of rape, 





By charging that Shute and I make “a mere sideshow” of the emotions, 
Watt means that we underestimate their importance. But not only that. He 
also means that we err in treating emotions as answerable to reasons. If that 
is an error, I have just repeated it in sections I and II. I treated it as a proper 
question to ask whether a certain emotion experienced by a rape victim (or 
by anyone) is reasonable, in proportion, sensitive to value, etc. Watt 
denounces this (as he sees it) “Kantian” rational scrutiny of our emotions 
in favour of (what he takes to be) its “Humean” rival, according to which 
                                                 
15 Although our tone could itself be the object of added outrage. We pointed that 
out in the essay (Gardner and Shute, ‘Wrongness’ (n 3) 2), hoping that our readers 
would not allow their outrage at the thought of the imaginary rape to get mixed up 
with their outrage at our writing about it with such sang-froid as we did. To judge 
by Watt’s reactions, our hope was in vain. Some of his complaints seem to be 
complaints about the dessicated ways of philosophers as such. See e.g. Watt (n 1) 
49. 
16 Contentious because for some ‘rape is rape’ and does not admit of degrees of 
seriousness. This means refusing to differentiate among rapes according to their 
consequences, and hence, rejecting “victim impact statements” and the like. ‘Rape 
is rape’ is a slogan usually traced to 1970s campaigner Del Martin. She continued: 
“The identity of the rapist does not alter the fact of his act, nor lessen its traumatic 
effects on the victim.” Del Martin, Battered Wives (Volcano, California 1976) 181, 
[italics added]. Notice that the italicised words allow that rape would be less serious 
if it were less traumatic. So Martin did not believe that rape did not admit of degrees 
of seriousness. She merely thought that the identity of the rapist, on its own, was 
irrelevant to the degree of seriousness.  
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‘reason is the slave of the quiet passions.’17 For Watt,this means “that our 
first evaluation of an occurrence, such as rape, is emotional rather than 
rational,”18 that “emotions are right at the forefront of our assessment of 
wrongdoing.”19 In this sense, “[o]ne might even say that reason is the true 
epiphenomenon.”20 
Consider Watt’s words “our first evaluation of an occurrence, such as 
rape, is emotional rather than rational.” Clearly the word “first” here is a 
red herring. There was nothing in what Shute and I wrote to suggest that 
one feels or should feel no horror, grief, fury or dread at anything in advance 
of knowing what it is about that thing that makes it horrifying, grievous, 
infuriating or dreadful. Indeed what we said is even compatible with the 
more radical possibility that horror, grief, fury or dread may properly strike 
one even before one knows what the horrifying, grievous, infuriating or 
dreadful thing is (never mind knowing what it is about it that makes it 
horrifying, grievous, infuriating or dreadful). Watt misleads his readers, 
then, by presenting his disagreement with us as being about whether, when 
we face something that (properly) evokes emotion, emotion is (properly) 
the first thing to be evoked. Probably this is just a slip on his part; probably 
it is an explanatory rather than a temporal primacy that he really has in mind 
when he puts emotions “first.” 
More revealing, however, are the remaining words in Watt’s sentence. 
In acknowledging that “our ... evaluation of an occurrence” can be 
emotional, he acknowledges that emotions can have objects, that it is 
possible to feel horror, grief, fury, or dread at something or about 
something or towards something, including something “such as rape.” Not 
only possible, one might add, but par for the course. Even if one does not 
yet know what the object of one’s emotional reaction is (even if one does 
not yet know what it is, say, that is giving one the creeps or the screaming 
heeby-jeebies) it is surely a built-in feature of one’s emotional reaction that 
it draws one’s attention to its object, or at least puts one on the lookout for 
its (as yet undetected) object. If one doesn’t yet know what one is reacting 
to, one’s reaction inclines one to wonder what it is that one is reacting to. 
If that much is true, then already one is relating to one’s own reactions 
in the “critical” way that I described in section III above. One is asking why 
– in response to what – one feels as one does, and so one is treating one’s 
emotions as answerable to reasons. If one discovers that there is nothing to 
be afraid of, or nothing to be angry about, or nothing to be surprised at, then 
typically one’s fear or anger or surprise (as the case may be) evaporates – 
                                                 
17 Watt (n 1) 58. 
18 Ibid 59. 
19 Ibid 60. 
20 Ibid 59. 
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although of course it may give way to embarrassment at one’s gullibility, 
or shame at one’s prejudice, etc. And if one discovers that what there is to 
be afraid of or angry about or surprised at is not as much as at first one 
imagined, then typically one’s fear or anger or surprise abates pro tanto – 
although of course it may give way to annoyance at one’s tendency to 
exaggerate, frustration at one’s lack of discernment, etc. The necessary 
adjustments when one discovers the truth in such cases might not, I hasten 
to add, be instantaneous; emotions that we discover to be misplaced, 
misdirected, or out of proportion, can be sticky. Sometimes one even hunts 
around subconsciously to find some alternative object that would license 
one to continue feeling as one already does. One’s emotion cries out, if you 
like, for some object in the world to which it may still qualify as a fitting 
reaction. And that is all that there is to (typical) emotion’s answerability to 
reasons. It is no more and no less than is already implicit in Watt’s own 
proposal that in or by an emotion we “evaluat[e] ... an occurrence.” We take 
something good or bad in the world to befit the emotion in question, even 
if we don’t yet know what that something is. And Watt says precisely that, 
even about rape: at the thought of rape, we suffer “natural emotional 
nausea.”21 Not any old reaction, notice, but the one that befits rape, and that 
comes naturally to us as beings who respond to reasons. 
Does Watt manage to distance himself somehow from the implications 
of his remarks, as I have just exposed them? Elsewhere in his discussion he 
is sympathetic to a view put forward by John Stanton-Ife, to which I am 
also sympathetic, that rape is or is prone to be “destructive of personality 
itself.”22 That of course is a reason too, a reason, if Stanton-Ife is right, that 
is capable of bearing dramatically on the wrongness of rape. When it bears 
on the wrongness of rape, it bears by the very same token on the 
reasonableness of various emotional reactions to rape. That a victim’s 
personality would or might be destroyed by rape (if and when that is true) 
is surely a major reason to fear being raped, as well as to abhor rapists and 
relish their getting their comeuppance, to be saddened by the human 
capacity for evil, to be anxious or alarmed for the victim, to feel vengeful 
or heartbroken on her behalf, and more generally, in a suitably empathetic 
way,23 to share the victim’s pain. 
                                                 
21 Ibid 61. 
22 Watt (n 1) 60, referring to John Stanton-Ife, ‘Horrific Crime’ in RA Duff et al 
(eds) The Boundaries of the Criminal Law (2010). Watt’s sympathy for the view 
is conveyed in Watt (n 1) 47 n 3. 
23 I believe I am at one with Watt in saying that empathy is not an emotion; it is an 
ability and propensity to share in another’s emotions, also called “fellow-feeling.” 
I would add, as maybe Watt would not, that empathetic people tend to draw the 
 
REASONABLE REACTIONS TO THE WRONGNESS OF RAPE 
 
10 
These emotional reactions all answer to (inter alia) the Stanton-Ife 
reason, when that reason holds. But you may say – and Watt may be read 
as saying24 – that the last entry on the list reveals a special twist in the 
Stanton-Ife reason. For one part of a victim’s personality that might be 
damaged or destroyed by rape is the emotional part, which is, as Watt 
rightly says, a “vital part.”25 The person raped might be thereby rendered 
unrecognisable in respect of some emotional traits (going from sunny, 
open, and carefree, say, to wary, preoccupied, and panicky). Couldn’t this 
help to show that reasons are the “true epiphenomenon” in the case of rape? 
We should all have negative emotional reactions to rape partly for the 
Stanton-Ife reason, true enough; but the Stanton-Ife reason itself refers us 
back to (the rape victim’s) emotions. So this explanation of rape’s 
wrongness bottoms out, does it not, in emotions rather than reasons? Not 
so if the emotions have the rape as their object. Not so if Watt is right to 
think that, in or by her emotions (however transformed by the rape) the rape 
victim “evaluates” the rape. Not so, in other words, if she is still capable of 
asking what it is about the rape that makes her feel as she does. Suppose, 
as is understandable, that at least in the early months she finds it hard to 
grasp the reasons why she feels as she does (perhaps because it is hard to 
confront them when the experience is still so immediate). Finding the 
reasons hard to grasp, but still tortured by her feelings, she sometimes 
worries that she might be going mad. That worry is fully intelligible on the 
Shute/Gardner view, which turns out also to be the Watt view: since even 
very intense emotions answer to reason, being unable to grasp the reason 
for them is worrying. So one reassuring sign concerning our rape victim’s 
mental health is that, when confronted with very sticky emotions that she 
struggles to make intelligible even to herself, she still has this fully 
intelligible worry about her sanity. That shows that there is hope for her to 
get back to living her life, even if that means living a different life from the 
one she lived before and would have been living still, were it not for the 
rape.26 
                                                 
line at unreasonable feelings. Empathy is not a judgment-free trait. For discussion 
see Jesse Prinz, ‘Against Empathy’ (2011) 49 Southern Journal of Philosophy 214, 
and the reply in the same volume by Julia Driver. 
24 Watt (n 1) 47 n 3. 
25 Ibid 49. 
26 Is having a different life necessarily a bad thing? You might think not in a case 
in which the life afterwards includes less naivety, more strength of character, more 
sense of who one’s friends really are, etc. But I tend to think that even a case like 
this is double-edged. Disillusionment represents a harm, it seems to me, even if 
one should not have had the illusions in the first place. I say more about this in my 
forthcoming book From Personal Life to Private Law. 
 





Since Watt seems to hold emotions answerable to reasons in exactly the 
same way that Shute and I do, one must conclude that he, mistakenly, takes 
us to be holding emotions answerable to reasons in some other, presumably 
more objectionable, way.  
What is that way? Strangely, without supporting evidence, Watt seems 
to land us with the view that people should react to the world 
dispassionately, repressing their emotions in favour of “reason[ing] out a 
course of action” in a cool-headed way. 27  This is a view commonly 
(although contentiously) associated with Kant, and according to Watt “the 
thrust of [the Shute-Gardner] argument is Kantian.”28 Whether it is Kant’s 
view or not, however, it is diametrically opposed to our view. Since 
emotions answer to reason, they belong to what Aristotelians (among 
whom we number ourselves) call “the rational part of the soul.”29 True, 
one’s emotions are capable of seducing one into doing the wrong thing; but 
reasoning out a course of action in a cool-headed way is no less capable of 
doing that. Neither the passionate nor the dispassionate among us has any 
a priori claim to be generally more effective in securing anyone’s (including 
their own) conformity with reasons; whether a more or less emotional 
reaction will lead to better reason-conformity just depends on which 
reasons we are talking about, which emotions, in which circumstances, for 
which person, in respect of which action, and so on. Sometimes, surely, a 
cold calculation is just the opposite of what is called for. Sometimes fleeing 
in terror, looking away in disgust, remonstrating furiously, weeping with 
frustration, or hanging one’s head in shame is the only reasonable reaction. 
Shute and I said nothing to suggest otherwise. 
In fact, and somewhat strangely, it is Watt who suggests otherwise. 
Watt ultimately joins with Kant, or with Kant as contentiously interpreted, 
in asserting the “irrationality of emotion.”30 He thereby gives succour to the 
false idea that emotion tends to stand in the way of conformity with reasons, 
and should, so far as conformity with reasons is concerned, be avoided. It 
follows from this idea that if emotions are to be “rehabilitated,”31 to be 
restored to their proper place as “a vital part of the human personality”32 as 
Watt thinks they should be, that rehabilitation cannot be in the name of 
                                                 
27 Watt (n 1) 59. 
28 Ibid 47. 
29 See e.g. M Nussbaum, ‘Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion’ in AO 
Rorty (ed), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric (University of California Press 1996). 
30 Watt (n 1) 61. 
31 Ibid 49. 
32 Ibid.  
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conformity with reasons. Accordingly, thinks Watt, we had better learn to 
care less about conformity with reasons. Why be reasonable, he wonders, 
when you could be in touch with your feelings? And he imagines us 
responding, tit-for-tat, with the reverse question: Why be in touch with your 
feelings when you could be reasonable? That question certainly has 
something going for it as compared with Watt’s. Both questions are ‘why?’ 
questions that can only be answered by giving a reason. Thus Watt’s 
question “why be reasonable when you could be in touch with your 
feelings?” is a question the asking of which already presupposes the 
primacy of reasonableness.33 That gives a huge advantage to the riposte: 
Why be in touch with your feelings, when you could be reasonable? But be 
that as it may, the riposte question is not the one that Shute and I asked. Our 
question was: How about having, or at least aspiring to have, reasonable 
feelings? We therefore did not sign up, as Watt does, to the false choice 
between reasonableness and emotionality. For we did not share his faith in 
the “irrationality of emotion.” We thought (and I for one continue to think) 
that emotions not only answer to reasons, but often answer to reasons well, 
helping (sometimes enabling) people to do and be what they have reason to 
do and be. 
The last formulation shows how Watt can square his belief in the 
“irrationality of emotion” with the belief that he seems to share with Shute 
and me, namely that emotions answer to reasons. Obviously it is possible 
to hold that emotions answer to reasons while holding that they do so badly 
– that, when it comes to improving our conformity with reasons, emotion 
is generally a poor guide, or at any rate a poorer guide than dispassionately 
“reason[ing] out a course of action.” This is a popular combination of views 
– emotions are not arational, but they are irrational – and it is plausible to 
attribute it to Kant. Curiously, it is also plausible, on closer inspection, to 
attribute it to Watt. But it is not at all plausible to attribute it to Shute and 
me. We say of emotions: they are not arational and they are not notably 
irrational either. Allowing oneself to be guided by one’s emotions can 
sometimes lead one astray, of course.34 But cool calculation is no less prone 
to do so, at any rate a priori. (There may, of course, be a posteriori 
discrepancies in the success rates of these two modalities across different 
classes of actions, different agents, different reasons, different emotions, 
different times and places, etc. All of that would call for empirical 
research.) 
                                                 
33 Gardner, ‘The Mark of Responsibility’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 157; later version in Gardner, Offences and Defences (n 3). 
34 On overestimating the rational reliability of emotion, see my, ‘Wrongdoing by 
Results: Moore’s Experiential Argument’ (2012) 18 Legal Theory 459. 





A different strand of Watt’s critique is concerned, not with the very idea 
that emotions answer to reasons, but with the particular reason that Shute 
and I advanced as bearing on the wrongness of rape, and as providing a 
basis for negative emotional reactions to it. Rape, we suggested, is the 
“sheer use” of a person.35 This is the “basic and essential” reason (a) not to 
commit it and (b) to feel as we do feel about it when it is committed. In this 
proposal Shute and I admittedly alighted on a vaguely Kantian idea.36 
Perhaps it is this that leads Watt to think, mistakenly, that we must follow 
Kant on other matters too. Be that as it may, I am no longer as sure as I 
once was that the proposal that Shute and I made is exactly right. All I can 
say is that it is in the right neighbourhood. I think we were right to think of 
rape as a kind of objectification of a person, but possibly wrong to narrow 
down the relevant kind of objectification so exclusively to sheer use.37 
Watt does not, however, make an objection to our proposal along these 
lines. He does not say that some rapes are not sheer uses. Rather he repeats 
a converse objection made by Danny Statman a few years ago:38 that many 
sheer uses are not rapes. Statman gave the example of “a medical student 
making use of a person’s body by creeping into her room whilst she is 
unconscious and examining her facial structure to revise for his 
examination.” 39  He didn’t deny that this would be wrong; he merely 
pointed out that what Shute and I said about rape would be “incomplete”40 
if we failed to explain why the rape, in our much discussed example, seems 
so much more egregious than the facial examination in his example, even 
though both are sheer uses of a person. Watt does not mention my reply to 
Statman, in which I pointed out that Shute and I had, in fact, offered the 
sketch of an explanation towards the end of our essay.41 Our explanation 
                                                 
35 Gardner and Shute, ‘Wrongness’ (n 3) 16. 
36 We said that we ‘echoed’ Kant: Gardner and Shute, ‘Wrongness’ (n 3) 17. 
37  I was given fresh food for thought on this question by M Mikkola, 
‘Dehumanization’ in Thom Brooks (ed), New Waves in Ethics (Basingstoke 2011) 
and more recently by M Plaxton, ‘Nussbaum on Sexual Instrumentaliation’ (2016) 
10 Criminal law and Philosophy forthcoming. 
38 D Statman, ‘Gardner on the Wrongness of Rape’ (2012) 4 Jerusalem Review of 
Legal Studies 105. Hereafter Statman, ‘Gardner on the Wrongness of Rape.’ 
39 Watt (n 1) 47, paraphrasing Statman, ‘Gardner on the Wrongness of Rape’ (n 
38) 108-9. 
40 Watt (n 1) 47, echoing Statman, ‘Gardner on the Wrongness of Rape’ (n 38) 109.  
41 Gardner, ‘In Defence of Offences and Defences’ (2012) 4 Jerusalem Review of 
Legal Studies 110. 
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was that rape takes an important and socially influential ideal of subject-
subject relations – human sexual relations – and turns it on its head. This 
gives a special social meaning to rape that other sheer uses do not share.42 
In a new (forthcoming) article, called ‘The Opposite of Rape,’ I have 
explored this point in a lot more detail.43 I have worked out the relevant 
ideal of good sex in a way that reveals, I think, why rape is the very 
antithesis of it, and thereby helps us to see what it is that is especially wrong 
with rape that does not extend to Statman’s example of the facial 
examination. You do not need to read ‘The Opposite of Rape,’ however, to 
see that Shute and I anticipated Statman’s point and answered it. In my 
reply to Statman I even quoted the relevant paragraph.44 
Watt turns the screw a little further than Statman. He devises an 
example of sheer use of another person in human sexual relations that does 
not strike him as wrong at all, and certainly nowhere near the rape end of 
the spectrum. This move, if successful, neatly sidesteps what Shute and I 
said in anticipation of Statman’s objection. For we played the “sex is 
special” card to show what is especially wrong with sheer use of a person 
in the sexual context; and Watt’s example is designed to show that sheer 
use of a person need not be especially wrong even in the sexual context. In 
Watt’s example, a woman called Mary “wants to be ‘used’” in a controlled 
sense by [her lover, John] so that she feels no responsibility for that which 
has happened.’45 In particular (in a nice echo of the rape hypothetical that 
Shute and I devised) Mary would like to experiment with John’s attempting 
to “make love to her while she is asleep.”46 What could Shute and I say 
about this case to explain how distant it is from our case, without giving up 
our “sheer use” doctrine? A possible response is that Watt’s is an example 
of “sheer use” in quotation marks, rather than sheer use. In an aspect of the 
story that Watt only hints at, and may not mean to rely upon, Mary’s wish 
to experiment in this way is an aspect of what is sometimes known as a 
“rape fantasy.”47 If Watt means to rely upon this feature of the example, 
then the example tends to count in favour of, not against, the position that 
Shute and I took. For if rape is sheer use of a person, then a theatrical 
representation of rape ought by the same token to be a theatrical 
representation of sheer use of a person. On this reading, Watt’s words 
“controlled in a sense” mean that John is to be guided throughout by Mary’s 
script. He must regard and conduct himself as a player in Mary’s 
                                                 
42 Gardner and Shute, ‘Wrongness’ (n 3) 22-3. 
43 Gardner, ‘The Opposite of Rape’ draft online at <http://bit.ly/1Ph522i>. 
44 Gardner, ‘In Defence of Offences and Defences’ (n 41) 126-7. 
45 Watt (n 1) 54. 
46 Ibid 53. 
47 Ibid 54 (n 27). 
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production, not engaging in sheer use of her but only in the portrayal of 
sheer use of her, albeit as authentically and with as much improvisation as 
he can manage and she requires. Imagine that he gets carried away with the 
role and starts to regard the sleeping Mary as his sex toy rather than as the 
impresario behind the show in which she plays the role of his sex toy. Then, 
surely, the case shifts decisively back towards our rape hypothetical. 
But suppose the “fantasy” theme is another red herring in Watt’s 
critique. Suppose Mary doesn’t want any masquerade. She wants her lover 
to fuck her while she’s out cold, ‘just like the imaginary woman in that 
Shute-Gardner article I was reading today’ (she tells him). The whole point 
is that she’s volunteering to be an actual sex toy. Tonight, after she’s 
popped a couple of roofies and got herself a bit aroused, John is to use her 
in her stupefied form as if she were a kind of super-realistic inflatable doll. 
No injuries allowed of course (remember the Shute-Gardner example) but 
otherwise it’s all to be at his whim, with no thought of her as any kind of 
participant. The thought that she will be reduced to an object in this way 
turns her on, she says, and the thought of once having been reduced to an 
object in this way, she thinks and says, will routinely turn her on afterwards. 
‘Why not?’ she asks. ‘It’s just some harmless fun.’ If that is more or less 
the story, then Watt’s example fits into a different part of the Shute-Gardner 
analysis.48 It is the kind of sexual activity which is covered by the right to 
sexual freedom. People may waive the duty that others owe them not to 
mistreat them sexually. It does not mean that there is no mistreatment. Like 
other rights to freedom (freedom of speech, association, conscience, etc.), 
the right to sexual freedom is mainly there to license people to do 
objectionable things, and often these things remain objectionable even 
when done under the license of the right. The right to sexual freedom 
licenses people – mainly by use of their power to consent – to carry out 
ignominious sexual experiments with others, to take up sexually degrading 
lines of work, and of course to have casual and meaningless “utility sex” 
with virtual strangers. Exercising the right, as Mary does with John, is 
capable of taking acts in the “sheer use” category right out of the ‘rape’ 
category even though they meet the other conditions to qualify as rape. To 
test the hypothesis, just imagine that John is really into Mary’s idea, not out 
of an uxorious zeal to cater to her peculiar tastes, but because he really likes 
the idea of fucking an unconscious woman. That doesn’t make him a rapist 
but it does make him a sleazeball with what today are sometimes called 
‘rapey’ tastes, and it’s just as well for him that he has met someone, in 
Mary, who happens to exercise her right to sexual freedom in a way that 
caters, depressingly, to his sleaziness. Why, perhaps his sleaziness is even 
part of his attraction for her. As Watt says, many people have kinky sexual 
                                                 
48 Gardner and Shute, ‘Wrongness’ (n 3) 16-21. 
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tastes, including tastes to use others and be used by them, and many suffer 
associated sexual attractions for what their parents might call ‘unsuitable’ 
partners.49 The right to sexual freedom, as Shute and I explained at some 
length in our essay, is what protects people in giving effect to those tastes 
and attractions even where, as Watt very understatedly puts it in Mary’s 
and John’s case “we may not wholly approve of the[ir] antics.”50 
So it turns out that Shute and I anticipated Watt’s example as well as 
Statman’s. We explained when and why sheer use of someone in sexual 
relations is “not wrongful”51 (Watt’s expression) even when it meets all the 
other conditions for qualifying as rape. On the other hand we did not 
suggest, as Watt thinks we should have done, that it is “it is the emotional 
context of that ‘use’ which is important.”52 Nor should that be conceded. I 
do not doubt that in sexual matters, emotional connection is of great 
importance. It is one of many respects in which good sex may be good. It 
can be a redeeming feature of sex that it is some other ways pretty bad. But 
I very much doubt whether it has any role to play in explaining why John, 
while (zealously or otherwise) carrying out Mary’s kinky request, is no 
rapist. Possibly it explains, further back, why Mary felt comfortable in 
giving John her consent to make sheer use of her. But it is her consent that 
matters to the question of why he is no rapist, and that would equally protect 
him from being a rapist if Mary were an easygoing stranger he met in a bar, 
or a niche prostitute who specialises in offering the use of her sedated body 
to sleazy men who are into the idea of fucking an unconscious woman. The 
emotional context of all this sexual activity is a matter of evaluative 
importance in various ways. But it is not important, I persist in thinking, in 





                                                 
49 Watt (n 1) 58. 
50 Ibid. 
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